Brian Levine and Joanne Pasquarelli from the University of Massachusetts, Loyd Richardson from Protect Children, and Clay Shields from Georgetown University

What is the human cost of encrypted communications? At the 2025 Trust and Safety Research Conference at Stanford University, one of the most sobering sessions I attended was a panel titled The Role of Tor in Human Rights Abuses of Children.

As a recent graduate of Cornell University, where I studied Information Science and Communication & Technology, I came to this conference through a year of academic work in online safety. Under the mentorship of Dr. J. Nathan Matias, I developed a thesis focused on how platform policies and design impact the spread of CSAM. That work led me to join the Citizens and Technology (CAT) Lab. Beyond my academics, I founded Active Love USA, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit dedicated to supporting victims of human trafficking, domestic violence, and child abuse; I also had the opportunity to intern with the Human Trafficking Unit at the Florida State Attorney’s Office. These experiences, among others, have shaped my ongoing commitment to exposing the systems that allow abuse to persist — and made attending this panel especially meaningful.

The panel, led by Brian Levine and Joanne Pasquarelli from the University of Massachusetts Amherst Rescue Lab, Loyd Richardson from Canadian Center for Child Protection, and Clay Shields from Georgetown University, focused on the ways Tor, a network created to increase privacy, has been co-opted to facilitate the distribution of child sexual abuse material (CSAM). 

Often, it is described as a tool for anonymity. Tor routes internet traffic through a series of relays, known as onion servers, to obscure a user’s Internet Protocol (IP) address; structures like the one that Tor has were originally created to protect dissidents, journalists, and others who needed to communicate information securely; however, the dark side of anonymity, as highlighted by the panelists, is that it allows CSAM to flourish. 

According to the speakers, there are more than 44,598 onion servers that host CSAM, with over 2 million pieces of abusive material circulating. Not only do forums on Tor persist for years, but they also allow offenders to create communities that normalize abuse and lower entry barriers for new offenders. Some forums even function as marketplaces, where perpetrators with access to children sell material or meet-up opportunities to others. KidFlix, a site that hosted CSAM, had over one million registered users before it was taken down by law enforcement. But, as the panelists noted, the fact that it can take months or even years to find and dismantle these sites means that by the time one is removed, several more have already taken its place. 

The panel also challenged the widespread belief that Tor is impenetrable. Although it does make tracking users harder, anonymity is not absolute. In fact, the panelists estimate that with around $10,000 USD per month, an IP address of an onion site can be decrypted; $20,000 USD per month raises the chances to 25%; and with $50,000 USD the chance is around 50%. Although for individuals these sums may sound like an investment, for governments or major tech companies they are modest. This means that Tor’s marketed “absolute security” is misleading.

The panel made it clear that while privacy-protecting tools like Tor serve important purposes, their exploitation for CSAM represents a profound violation of children’s rights; ultimately, it comes back to the very question at the center of trust and safety: When privacy and protection collide, which will the world choose?

For further reading & listening:

  • A podcast conversation with Brian Levine and Ethan Zuckerman, examining the tension between protecting children and preserving online liberties: Listen here
  • SOK: Content Moderation for End-to-End Encryption, a comprehensive paper on moderating harmful content on encrypted platforms: Read here